

# AFIR + RANGGEOMETERS OF A DESCRIPTION OF THE ROAD

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# Security Overlays on Core Internet Protocols – DNSSEC and RPKI

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#### Why are DNSSEC and RPKI Important

- Two critical resources
  - DNS
  - Routing
- Hard to tell if compromised
  - From the user point of view
  - From the ISP/Enterprise
- Focus on government funding



#### Why DNSSEC? What is it?

- Standard DNS (forward or reverse) responses are not secure
  - Easy to spoof
  - Notable malicious attacks
- DNSSEC attaches signatures
  - Validates responses
  - Can not spoof



#### Reverse DNS at ARIN

- ARIN issues blocks without any working DNS
  - Registrant must establish delegations after registration
  - -Then employ DNSSEC if desired
- Just as susceptible as forward DNS if you do not use DNSSEC



#### Reverse DNS at ARIN

- Authority to manage reverse zones follows allocations
  - -"Shared Authority" model
  - Multiple sub-allocation recipient entities may have authority over a particular zone



# Changes completed to make DNSSEC work at ARIN

- Permit by-delegation management
- Sign in-addr.arpa. and ip6.arpa. delegations that ARIN manages
- Create entry method for DS Records
  - ARIN Online
  - RESTful interface
  - Not available via templates



# Changes completed to make DNSSEC work at ARIN

- Only key holders may create and submit Delegation Signer (DS) records
- DNSSEC users need to have signed a registration services agreement with ARIN to use these services



#### Reverse DNS in ARIN Online

First identify the network that you want to put Reverse DNS nameservers on...

#### REVERSE DNS INFORMATION FOR NET-192-149-252-0-1

SELECT	DELEGATION	NAMESERVERS	DS RECORD KEY TAGS	AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATIONS
✓	252.149.192.in- addr.arpa.	NS1.ARIN.NET NS2.ARIN.NET NS2.LACNIC.NET SEC1.APNIC.NET SEC1.AUTHDNS.RIPE.NET		ARIN Operations

**MODIFY NAMESERVERS** 

MODIFY DS RECORDS



#### Reverse DNS in ARIN Online

...then enter the Reverse DNS nameservers...

#### **Manage Reverse DNS**

Using the text fields on the right, specify the hostnames (not the IP addresses) of the nameservers that should be authoritative for ALL the reverse DNS delegations listed on the left. Please note that any modifications will be applied to all listed delegations.

SELECTED DELEGATIONS IN - NET-192-149-252-0-1

252.149.192.in-addr.arpa.

HOSTNAMES OF NAMESERVERS			
Nameserver 1:	NS1.ARIN.NET		
Nameserver 2:	NS2.ARIN.NET		
Nameserver 3:	NS2.LACNIC.NET		
Nameserver 4:	SEC1.APNIC.NET		
Nameserver 5:	SEC1.AUTHDNS.RIPE.NET		
Nameserver 6:			
Nameserver 13:			


APPLY TO ALL





#### **DNSSEC in ARIN Online**

...then apply DS record to apply to the delegation





#### Reverse DNS: Querying ARIN's Whois

#### Query for the zone directly:

whois> 81.147.204.in-addr.arpa

Name: 81.147.204.in-addr.arpa.

Updated: 2006-05-15

NameServer: AUTHNS2.DNVR.QWEST.NET NameServer: AUTHNS3.STTL.QWEST.NET NameServer: AUTHNS1.MPLS.QWEST.NET

Ref: http://whois.arin.net/rest/rdns/81.147.204.in-addr.arpa.



#### **DNSSEC** in Zone Files

: File written on Mon Feb 24 17:00:53 2014

```
dnssec signzone version 9.3.6-P1-RedHat-9.3.6-20.P1.el5 8.6
                                IN NS
0.74.in-addr.arpa.
                        86400
                                        NS3.COVAD.COM.
                                IN NS
                        86400
                                        NS4.COVAD.COM.
                        10800
                                NSEC
                                        1.74.in-addr.arpa. NS RRSIG NSEC
                        10800
                                RRSIG
                                        NSEC 5 4 10800 20140306210053 (
                                        20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
                                        oNk3GVaCWj2j8+EAr0PncqnZeQjm8h4w51nS
                                        D2VUi7YtR9FvYLF/j4K0+8gYZ3TAixb9c05c
                                        8EVIhtY1grXEdOm30zJpZvaoaODpbHt8FdWY
                                        vwup9Tq4oVbxVyuSNXriZ2Mq55IIMgDR3nAT
                                        BLP5UClxUWkgvS/6poF+W/1H40Y= )
                                IN NS
                                        NS3.COVAD.COM.
                        86400
1.74.in-addr.arpa.
                        86400
                                IN NS
                                        NS4.COVAD.COM.
                        10800
                                NSEC
                                        10.74.in-addr.arpa. NS RRSIG NSEC
                        10800
                                RRSIG
                                        NSEC 5 4 10800 20140306210053 (
                                        20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
                                        DKYGzSDtIypDVcer5e+XuwoDW4auKy6G/OCV
                                        VTcfQGk+3iyy2CEK0ZuMZXFaaDvXnaxey9R1
                                        mjams519Ghxp2qOnnkOw6iB6mR5cNkYlkL0h
                                        lu+IC4Buh6DqM4HbJCZcMXKEtWE0a6dMf+tH
                                        sa+50V7ezX5LCuDvQVp6p0LftAE= )
```



#### **DNSSEC** in Zone Files

0.121.74.in-addr.arpa.	86400	IN NS	DNS1.ACTUSA.NET.
	86400	IN NS	DNS2.ACTUSA.NET.
	86400	IN NS	DNS3.ACTUSA.NET.
	86400	DS	46693 5 1 (
			AEEDA98EE493DFF5F3F33208ECB0FA4186BD
			8056 )
	86400	DS	46693 5 2 (
			66E6D421894AFE2AF0B350BD8F4C54D2EBA5
			DA72A615FE64BE8EF600C6534CEF )
	86400	RRSIG	DS 5 5 86400 20140306210053 (
			20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
			n+aPxBHuf+sbzQN4LmHzlOi0C/hkaSVO3q1y
			6J0KjqNPzYqtxLgZjU+IL9qhtIOocgNQib9l
			gFRmZ9inf2bER435GMsa/nnjpVVWW/MBRKxf
			Pcc72w2i0AMu2G0prtVT08ENxtu/pBfns0ZK
			nhCY8UOBOYLOLE5Whtk3XOuX9+U= )
	10800	NSEC	1.121.74.in-addr.arpa. NS DS RRSIG
NSEC			
	10800	RRSIG	NSEC 5 5 10800 20140306210053 (
			20140224210053 57974 74.in-addr.arpa.
			YvRowkdVDfv+PW42ySNUwW8S8jRyV6EKKRxe



#### **DNSSEC Validating Resolvers**

- www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/dnssec/
- www.isc.org/downloads/bind/dnssec/



# Reverse DNS Management and DNSSEC in ARIN Online

Available on ARIN's website

http://www.arin.net/knowledge/dnssec/





#### What is RPKI?


- Resource Public Key Infrastructure
- Attaches digital certificates to network resources
  - AS Numbers
  - IP Addresses
- Allows ISPs to associate the two
  - Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
  - Can follow the address allocation chain to the top




## What does RPKI accomplish?

- Allows routers or other processes to validate route origins
- Simplifies validation authority information
  - Trust Anchor Locator
- Distributes trusted information
  - Through repositories





















#### What does RPKI Create?

- It creates a repository
  - RFC 3779 (RPKI) Certificates
  - ROAs
  - CRLs
  - Manifest records



#### **Repository View**

```
./ba/03a5be-ddf6-4340-a1f9-1ad3f2c39ee6/1:
total 40
-rw-r--r--
           1 143
                 143
                       1543 Jun 26
                                    2009 ICcaIRKhGHJ-TqUZv8GRKqkidR4.roa
-rw-r--r 1 143 143
                       1403 Jun 26
                                    2009 cKxLCU94umS-qD4DOOkAK0M2US0.cer
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                       485
                            Jun 26
                                    2009 dSmerM6uJGLWMMQTl2esy4xyUAA.crl
-rw-r--r-- 1 143 143
                       1882 Jun 26
                                    2009 dSmerM6uJGLWMMQTl2esy4xyUAA.mnf
-rw-r--r 1 143
                  143
                       1542 Jun 26
                                    2009 nB0qDFtWffKk4VWqln-12pdFtE8.roa
```

A Repository Directory containing an RFC3779 Certificate, two ROAs, a CRL, and a manifest



### Repository Use

- Pull down these files using a manifestvalidating mechanism
- Validate the ROAs contained in the repository
- Communicate with the router marking routes "valid", "invalid", "unknown"
- Up to ISP to use local policy on how to route



#### **Possible Flow**

- RPKI Web interface -> Repository
- Repository aggregator -> Validator
- Validated entries -> Route Checking
- Route checking results -> local routing decisions (based on local policy)



# How you can use ARIN's RPKI System?

- Hosted
- Hosted using ARIN's RESTful service
- Web Delegated (being deprecated)
- Delegated using Up/Down Protocol



#### **Hosted RPKI**

- Pros
  - Easier to use
  - ARIN managed
- Cons
  - No current support for downstream customers to manage their own space (yet)
  - Tedious through the IU if you have a large network
  - We hold your private key



#### Hosted RPKI with RESTful Interace


- Pros
  - Easier to use
  - ARIN managed
  - Programmatic interface for large networks
- Cons
  - No current support for downstream customers to manage their own space (yet)
  - We hold your private key



### Delegated RPKI with Up/Down

- Pros
  - Same as web delegated
  - Follows the IETF up/down protocol
- Cons
  - Extremely hard to setup
  - Need to operate your own RPKI environment







#### Organization Hosted RPKI Terms of Service

?

#### **AGREEMENT**

I agree to the ARIN Hosted RPKI Terms of Service

You must accept the Hosted RPKI Terms of Service in order to proceed.

Access a printable .pdf version of the Hosted RPKI Terms of Service.

Enter your initials

Continue

#### TERMS OF SERVICE

AMERICAN REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, LTD.
RPKI TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT

YOU MUST READ AND ACCEPT THIS RPKI TERMS OF SERVICE AGREEMENT (THIS "AGREEMENT") BEFORE ACCESSING OR USING ANY RPKI SERVICES (AS DEFINED BELOW). IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT, DO NOT ACCESS OR USE ANY RPKI SERVICES.



Enter your ROA Request Generation Public Key below.

#### **ROA Request Generation Public Key:**

Learn more about the ROA Request Generation Key Pair. Or, just how to create one and extract the public key.

#### -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----

MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvBhoSmbRQhbSpTIM2Pqn hWcHL/6SHORJGCtuoMUS6tVamlqgdTZJw+8POFku+WIOLgUJOEw763rQVTsAq8WZ vs6px2FNr6CJftKAr3fg/T083vHYiMtYJnJbVPKJjdSQSylyUWleR2hYh/4LEOyK MPr3zAuDS2QOI6778OY/kpTEsCrwzp+dM4KtLGOQbyrkfSVIHgux5pCMzsQP/8nP son5vOlkWtkuFNmg8pXgLfEdBR6MC0Y7eKaTeYM6EEJ7rhUCY69SUq+SFmuwYFsg 7YNzRAErF9THpEWqOaOxaSu/4nwLVJ2oexksT6k4hsEWPadxJ0P3E0FHSb/YIfOS fwIDAQAB

----END PUBLIC KEY-----





#### **Hosted Certificates**



#### Information

Each resource certificate entry displays the number of Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), IP addresses or ranges, and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) covered by that certificate, and the date of the certificate's last update. For a listing of data elements for a given resource certificate, select Details.

For more information about resource certificates, visit ARIN's RPKI section.



**ARIN** 

Updated: 03-20-2013

ROAs: ()

Nets: 20

ASNs: 1()







Create a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) Request for SAMPLE-ORG

There are two ways to create and submit a ROA Request to ARIN:

**Browser Signed ROA Request** Complete the required fields below and digitally sign the ROA Request using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Signed ROA Request. You must construct a precisely formatted text block containing your ROA Request information, and sign it using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Browser Signed Sig	ned		
ROA Name:	2		* denotes optional field
Origin AS:	0		
Start Date:	03-20-2013		
End Date:	03-20-2023		
Prefix:	/ Max	c Length add	<b>②</b>
Private Key:	Choose File No file chosen  This key will not be uploaded to ARIN.	Key Not Loaded	
	This key will not be appoaled to AKIN.		



Create a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) Request for SAMPLE-ORG

There are two ways to create and submit a ROA Request to ARIN:

**Browser Signed ROA Request** Complete the required fields below and digitally sign the ROA Request using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Signed ROA Request. You must construct a precisely formatted text block containing your ROA Request information, and sign it using the private key that corresponds with the public key you registered with ARIN.

Browser Signed S	gned			
ROA Name:	Test-ROA ?		± denotes o	ptional field
Origin AS:	23456			
Start Date:	03-20-2013			
End Date:	03-20-2023			
Prefix:	70.182.32.0	Max Length *24 add	0	
Private Key:	Key Loaded  This key will not be uploaded to ARIN.			



#### SUBMIT SIGNED ROUTE ORIGIN AUTHORIZATION

This information will not be saved until you click the **Submit** button below. Note that the signature is used by ARIN to ensure that the ROA Request was signed with your private key. Please verify that the information below is correct. Click **Submit** to send the request, or click **Back** to make changes.

ROA Name: Test-ROA

Origin AS: 23456

Validity Period: 03-20-2013 to 03-20-2023

Resources: 70.182.32.0/24 max length 24

Signature: Hjnse52POzaVFupNDGqYXZVyImr78wSd4A1XEMUpj4vVmpJWWH

nKoZRupDvB2OBtwcJJEyx4KUWPgHUt8VhdCYroyuZGRxJkDtTe q8c0FT2QQdjuD+GmwUWlvtnSD26VZdYUrXM6WniTVwL96UV6sK bJGTx40GqD52tdJq6612QpC6K+Y+JEISgauVyy2htnAPI5rl1Z

GY42Fb9c1CEoE8GmT/FWY+CX6UmKsxJ8LQ0NGR2XUeGKZyc2k5 gKiSCog976Vnltt88/z5jOm1GkYQoQvk6uyy+yYUKreC+GyNqP YyPAvGAq61jYIDXMhDTSjWdGRiV2dNQ8zMmoDOgm9A==

BACK


**Submit Signed ROA Request** 



LISTING SERVICE


DOWNLOADS

ASK ARIN




Your ROA request is automatically processed and the ROA is placed in ARIN's repository, accompanied by its certificate and a manifest. Users of the repository can now validate the ROA using RPKI validators.
















- You have to do all the ROA creation
- Need to setup a CA
- Have a highly available repository
- Create a CPS



#### Updates within RPKI outside of ARIN

- The four other RIRs are in production with Hosted CA services
- ARIN and APNIC have delegated working for the public
- Major routing vendor support being tested
- Announcement of public domain routing code support



#### **ARIN Status**

- Hosted CA deployed 15 Sept 2012
- Web Delegated CA deployed 16 Feb 2013
- Delegated using "Up/Down" protocol deployed 7 Sept 2013
- RESTful interface deployed 1 Feb 2014



# **RPKI Usage**

	Oct 2012	Apr 2013	Oct 2013	Apr 2014
RPAs Signed	27	72	130	162
Certified Orgs		47	68	108
ROAs	19	60	106	162
Covered Resources	30	82	147	258
Web Delegated		0	0	0
Up/Down Delegated			0	0



### Why is this important?

Provides more credibility to identify resource holders

Leads to better routing security

# Q&A

